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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah 
FLORENTINO LOVATO, 
Plaintiff and Apprllant, 
vs. 
BEATRICE FOODS, DBA UTAH 
BY-PRODUCTS COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11453 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by an employee against 
his employer to recover damages for a personal injury 
sustained during the conrsE> of his employment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was granted and Plaintiff's motion to strike certain de-
fenses raised in Defendant's Answer was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the lower court's Sum-
mary Judgment granted in favor of Defendant and of 
its denial of Plaintiff's Motion To Strike. 
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Defendant disputes the major portion of tlw State. 
ment of Facts contained in Plaintiff's written lH'ief filr1i 
herein on appeal since it is predominantly in the nahm 
of an argunwnt and the purported facts therein stated 
are not supported hy the record. Defendant therefon 
l'Pstat('S the facts as supported hy the record. 
D<->fendant is and for the past several years has been 
a business operating in the State of 1Jtah. Pursuant to 
Defendant's application, the Industrial Commission oi 
Utah issued Defondant a certificate dated January 2G. 
19G3, certifying that Defendant was qualified as a self-
insurer under the Utah \Vorkrnen's Compensation A('t 
as of February 28, 19G3, and pursuant to Defendant\ 
subsequent application dated Ft>bruary 17, 1966, the In 
dustrial Commission of Utah included Utah By-Prodncb 
Company with Beatrice Foods Company as a self-insur('r 
under the Act as of Fehrnary 28, 19GG. From then until 
the prPsPnt time, the dd'0ndant, Beatrice Foods dba Utah 
B~·-Prodnets Company, has been considered on the rrr-
ords of the Industrial Connnission of Utah as a self-
insurer nndPr the Utah \V orkm0n 's Comp<>nsation Act. 
Defendant's cPrtification as a S(•lf-insnn~r has nev(~r been 
revokPd nor questimwd hy the Indnstrial Commission. 
(D.-+ - Affidavit of Yirginia LPah~·) 
Since• D<>fendant's <'Prtification hy the Indnstrial 
Commission as a self-insnn•r and for s<>veral yPars prior 
3 
th(•reto, tlH' Indm;tria1 Commission has nt-ither required 
nor requested that self-insurer companies furnish annual 
proof of financial ability to pay direct compensation. It 
l1as apparently instead relied upon the records of the 
f ndustrial Commission relative to claims made and paid 
and th0 annual reports and payment of self-insurers' 
tax submitted to tlw Ptah Tax Commission. 
In addition to having been certified as a self-insurer 
hy the Industrial Commission, Defendant has fully com-
plied with the Jffovisions of Section 35-1-53, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 hy filing annual payroll reports and pay-
ing annually to the Tax Commission the special tax 
imposed upon self-insurers. (D. 4 - Affidavit of Ray 
.TorgPnsen) Also on or ahout September 8, 1968, the 
Tndustrial Commission sent to all self-insurer companies 
in Ftah a request for a financial statement and defendant 
n'sponded b;r filing its financial statement with the Com-
mission on September 12, 19()8. 
( )n Octoh0r 1, 1 D(i8, Plaintiff sPrvPd Defendant with 
a f.luw1110ns and Complaint filed in the District Conrt of 
W<'li('r County w1wrt>in hf' statPs that on .June 14, 1968, 
l'laintifi' sPVPred his left tltumh at the first joint while 
<11wrating a machinP during the course of his employment 
with I)pfrndant, and he allegt>s that his injury ~was caused 
liy tliP n<>gligencP of Def0ndant. Ht> furtht>r alleges that 
D(·frndant had failed to comply with Sections 35-1-46 
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& 35-1-47 of the vVorknwn's Com1wnsation Act relative 
to the securing of comp0nsation payments by eitlwr ob-
taining compensation insurance cov0rage or hy qualify-
ing as a s0lf-insurt>r and that he is tJH'r0fore entitled, 
pursuant to Rrction 35-1-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
to maintain a civil conrt action for his injury. Defend-
ant filed its Ans1Yt>r to Plaintiff's Complaint wherein 
it denied negligence on its part, ass0rted the defenses of 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk and fur-
ther asserted that Plaintiff's civil court action for dam-
ages from his injnr:v is barred b:- Section 35-l-GO Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 which provides that Plaintifh 
Pxclusive remedy for his injury is tlw compensation 
provided for in the Utah ·workmen's Compensation Act. 
(D. 3) 'l1hen on OctobPr 15, 1968, Defendant filed its 
Motion for Summary Judgment supported by the Affi-
davits of Virginia Leahy and Ray Jorgensen relative 
to Defendant's status and qualification as a self-insurer. 
Plaintiff responded by filing its i\Iotion to Strike the 
third, fourth, and fifth defensPs raised in Defendant's 
Ans>ver and on November 4, l9G8 Defendant's 1\fotion 
for Summary .Judgment and Plaintiff''s J\Iotion to Strike 
were l1eard together hefore .Judge Charles G. Cowley . 
• Judge Cowle:- took thP motions und<>r advisement and 
thereafter by OrdPr dated November 12, 1968, he granted 
defendant's Motion for Nmnmary Jndg1nent and dt>nied 
Plaintiff's l\f otion to Strike. (D. 8) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT IS A PROPERLY QUALI-
FIED INSURER UNDER THE UT AH 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AND 
PLAINTIFF'S CIVIL COURT ACTION REL-
ATIVE TO HIS INDUSTRIAL INJURY IS 
BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF SEC-
TION 35-1-60 OF THE ACT. 
The record clearly shows that Defendant is a duly 
qualified self-insnrE>r under the provisions of the Utah 
Work:nwn's Compensation Act and under the Rules and 
Hegnlations of the Industrial Commission of Utah. It is 
therefore entitled to the benefits of the Act which pro-
YidPs that an employee's exclusive remedy for recovery 
of rwrsonal injury damages sustained as a result of an 
industrial injury is the compensation provided for by 
th<:> Act. 8Pction 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
\'ides: 
"The right to reeoyer com1wnsation pursuant to 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by 
an Pmplo>·pe wht>ther rPsnlting· in death or not, 
shall he the exclnsin rPnwdy against the employer 
and shall he the <>xclnsiw rPmedy against any 
officer, agPnt or employee of the employer and 
tlw liabilities of the 0rnployPr imposed by this 
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act shall be in place of any and all other civil lia-
bility whatsoev~'.r, common law or otherwise, to 
such employee or to his spouse, widow, children, 
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal 
representatives, guardian, or an~- other person 
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury 
or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggra-
vated or incurn•d by such employee in the course 
of or because of or arising out of his employment, 
and no action at law may be maintained against 
an employer or against any officer agent or em-
ployee of the employer based upon any accident, 
injnry or death of an employee." 
This action is an attempt by Plaintiff to circumvent 
the \Vorkmen's Compensation Act by alleging that DP-
fendant is not qualified as a self-insnrer under the Act. 
Such an allegation is contrary to and nnsnpported b~· 
the evidence. As the record shows, Defendant was certi-
fied as a self-insurer by the Industrial Commission as of 
February 28, 1966. That certification has never been 
r\:'voked by the Commission and Defendant has always 
properly filed its annual pa~·roll report and paid its self-
insurer's tax to the State 'T'ax Commission. In addition, 
pursuant to the Industrial Commission's request, DP-
frndant filed its financial statmwnt with the Industrial 
Commission on September 12, 1968 and by letter received 
by Defendant from the Commission on September 19, 
1968, the Commission acknowledgc'd recPipt of Defend-
ant's annual report and stated that Defendant's privi-
lege as a s<'1f-immrer was continuing uninterrntped. 
'I'lrns, Defendant has lwen duly qnalified as a self-
insnrer 11nd0r the \Vorknwn's Compensation Act <>ver 
sincP it applied for and recPiwd its initial C('rtificate 
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from th0 Commission and, at least for the year 1968, 
which is the >"ear in which Plaintiff sustained his indus-
trial injnr>- and filPd his action in the lower court, De-
fendant has furnished its anual report to the Commission 
indicating satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay 
direct compensation. 
The argument contained in Plaintiff's written brief 
filed herein takes out of context one sentence of a three 
paragraph section of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
and attempts to show that there has been technical non-
compliance by the defendant of the particular provision in 
that SE:'ntence which provides for the filing of annual re-
ports with the Commission. Defendant submits that the 
true meaning of that section can only properly be acer-
tained h>- a reading of the Section as a whole and the ex-
traction of one sentmce from the statute tends to disguise 
the true intention of the legislature. Section 35-1-46, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 is set out in full as follows: 
"Employers except counties, cities, towns and 
school districts shall secure compensation to their 
(•rnplo>'ees in one of th<> follmYing ways: 
(1) B)' insuring, and keeping insured, the pay-
ment of snch corn1wnsation with the state insur-
ance fund. 
(2) By insuring and keeping insured, the pay-
ment of such comepnsations with any stock cor-
poration or mutnal association authorized to 
transact thP business of workmen's compensation 
insurance in this state. 
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(3) By furnishing annually to the commission 
satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay di-
rect compensation in the amount, in the manner 
and when due as provided for in this title. In such 
cases the commission may in its discretion require 
the deposit of acceptable security, indemnity or 
bond to secure the payment of compensation lia-
bilities as they are incurred and may at any time 
change or modi(\- its findings of fact herein pro-
vided for, if in its judgment such action is neces 
sary or desirable to secure or assure a strict 
compliance ·with all the provisions of law relating 
to the payment of compensation and the furnish-
ing of medical, nurse and hospital services, medi-
cines and burial expenses to injured, and to the 
dependents of killed employef's. The commission 
may in proper cases revoke any employer's privi-
lege as a self-insurer. 
The commission is hereby authorized and em-
powered to maintain a suit in any court of thl' 
state to enjoin any employer, within the provi-
sions of this act, from further operation of the 
employer's business, where the employer has 
failed to insure or to keep insured in one of the 
three ways in this section provided, the payment 
of compensation to injured employees, and upon 11 
showing of such failure to insure the court shall 
enjoin the further operation of such business until 
snch time as such insurance has been obtained b>-
the employer. The court may enjoin the employN 
without requiring bond from the commission. 
If the conunission has reason to believe that 
an employer of one or more employees is conduct-
ing a business without securing the paynwnt of 
compensation in one of th1c'. three ways pro,-i<l<'<l 
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in this section, the commission may give such em-
ployer five days written notice by registered mail 
of such noncompliance and if the employer within 
said period does not remedy such default, the 
commission may file snit as in this section above 
provided and the court is empowered, ex parte to 
issue without bond a temporary injunction re-
straining the further operation of the employer's 
business." (emphasis added) 
rr'he wording in sub-paragraph (3) of the above 
qnoted section indicates an intention to give the Com-
mission discretion as to what proof of financial ability 
or what security it ma)' require from those employers 
who elect to become self-insurers. The wording of the 
8ection indicates that the Commission should determine 
whether or not an employer has properly secured the 
payment compensation. In this connection, Defendant 
readily agrees with the rules of statutory construction set 
ont in the case of Spring Canyon Coal Company v. In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, 74 Utah 103, 277 P. 206 
(1929) "'hich Plaintiff relies upon in his brief. In that 
easP, this court stated: 
"Among the other well recognized rules applied 
in the construction of a statute are these: The 
language used mnst be rPad in a sense which 
harmonizes with the general purpose and objects 
of the statute .... " 
Jn a1Jplying this rule of statutory infrrprdation it would 
he eonsistent with the purpose of the vVorkmen's Com-
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pensation Act for this court to hold that the Industrial 
Commission has th1e' discretion to detenniiw wlwther a 
company qualifies as a self-insnrer nnder the \Vorlunen's 
Compensation Act and to detenninP for itsPlf the extent 
of the reports which it deems necessary to reqnjre from 
self-insun~rs so as to satisf)- the Commission that tlw 
payment of compensation is properly secured. The Com-
mission should certainly he allowed to rely upon its own 
records and npon the annual reports filPd by self-insnrers 
with the Tax Commission in making its judgments. 
The provision in the W orlunen's Comepnsation Act 
\\-hich Plaintiff attempts to rely upon in its attempt to 
circumvent the provisions of tht' Act is s<>t out in full 
at Section 35-1-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as follows: 
"Employers who shall fail to comply with the 
provisions of section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled 
to the benefits of this title durin.r; the period of 
noncompliance, hnt shall bP liahle in a civil action 
to their ernplo.n'es for damag<>s suffored hy rea-
son of iwrsonal injuries arising out of or in the 
course of employment caused hy the wrongful act, 
negelct or ddanlt of tlw ernplo.\-er or any of tlw 
employer's officers, agents or Pmplo~-ees, and also 
to the dependents or personal representatives oi' 
snch employees where death results from Sllch in-
juries. In any such action tlH' cl<'frndant slwli not 
a\·ail himself of an~- of the following defonse~: 
'l'he defonse of the ft>llow-svrvant rnl<', the (kfrnsl' 
of assumption of risk, or the dd<'nse of f'ontrihu-
tory negligence. Proof of th<> injury shall co11-
stitnt(, prirna facie PVi(l(•nc<> oi' neg-17g<'TIC1' on tl:I' 
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part of the employer and the burden shall be upon 
the employer to show freedom from negligence re-
sulting in snch injnry. And such employers shall 
also be subject to the provision of the two sections 
next succeeding." (emphasis added) 
'J'his provision does not define the "period of noncompli-
ance" nor does Section 35-1-46 of the Act indicate a date 
npon which annual reports should be filed or the par-
ticular period which such annual reports are intended 
to cover. Since Defendant did file its annual report in 
September 1968 it can only be assumed that such report 
would cover that year. Thus defendant was fully quali-
fied and had fully complied with the statute during the 
!"ear 1968 even to the extent of filing an annual report 
with the Commission and Plaintiff's civil court action 
mnst therefore fail. 
The obvious intent of Section 35-1-57 of the Act is 
to allow an employee to maintain a civil action against 
his employer if the employer has neither qualified as a 
self-insurer nor secured insurance coverage with an inde-
JlC'ndent company or the state insurance fund. This sec-
tion does not provide that such court action can be main-
tained simply because the Commission does not insist 
upon the filing of reports on an annual basis. If this 
eomt wen~ to adopt Plaintiff's conh·ntion that the mere 
failure of tlw Commission to n•qnire annual rt>ports from 
~elf-insurers should have the t>ff eet of suspending or 
terminating an employer's status as a self-insurer, the 
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effect of such a ruling would obvionsly han drastic and 
unintended consequences not only for this Defendant bnt 
for all self-insurers in Utah. Since the Industrial Com-
mission has not required the filing of annual reports 
for several years, Plaintiff's position would mean that 
no employer who has been deemed by himself and by the 
Commission as a self-insurer over the past several years 
has in fact been entitled to the benefits of the Work-
men's Compensation Act and any employee having a 
presently outstanding industrial claim against such an 
t•mployer for an injnr>- sustained during the "period of 
noncompliance," whatever that term may mean, would 
now be allowed to bring a civil action against his em-
ployer and attempt to prove fault on thP part of tllP em-
ployer. Such a rpsult wonld be manifestly unfair anrl 
contrary to thP ohvions pnrposPs of thP \Yorkmen's Com-
]H'nsation Act. 
Plaintiff devotes a major portion of his writtrn 
hrief to the argunwnt that the \Vorkmen 's Compensation 
Act ·was intended to gin' an employ<'<' security \Yith f('-
spect to the collection of his damages due to an indn:-:-
trial injury and that the prnvisions of Suction 35-1-~i 
are intended to grant security to an injured employee lJy 
allowing him a civil action wlwn sueh sPeurity is not oll-
tained by the emplo>-er's compliancP ·with the 1n·ovision' 
of flection 3;-J-1--ffi. Def Pndant tmlnnib that if in fad an 
employer is financially incapahl<> of making co1111wnsn-
tion payments m; provided for in tlH· \Y orkm('n 's Colli-
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pensation Act, then certainly he is without sufficient re-
sources to pay any jndgnwnt which an injured employee 
ma:· obtain in a ci,·il action brought against his employer 
pursuant to provisions of Section 35-1-57. Besides there 
is no evidence in this case that the Defendant is unable 
or even unwilling to pay the compensation. The true 
public policy and intPnded purpose behind the vVork-
man's Com1wnsation laws is explained at 58 Am. Jur., 
... \Vorlrmen's Com1wnsation," ~ 2, which is cited in Plain-
tiff's brief. Tlwre it is pointed out that workman's com-
pensation acts are intended to eliminate costly and bur-
dPnsouH:~ litigation, preYent disharmony between the em-
ployer and employee and limit and make fixed the em-
ployer's liability for industrial injuries. Certainly the 
attempt by Plaintiff in bringing this civil action is in 
direct conflict with these stated purposes and Plaintiff 
sl1onld not be allowed to dPfeat these purposes. 
D0fendant notes that Plaintiff's briPf cites no cases 
<:'ither from Utah or any other jurisdiction in which a 
court of law has supported his contention either in prac-
tice or in principlP. Defendant's research has also re-
veah~d no such cases. This lack of authority is undoubt-
ed!~· d1w to th(• Jack of irwrit in thP ]lOSition which Plain-
tiff is taking in this cas(•. 
CONCLUSION 
'I'lw facts in evidence sho\\' that Defendant Las been 
cluJ)· qnalifo~d as a self-insurer under tlw Utah ·work. 
lll<>n\; Compensation Act since it was originally so certi-
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fied by the Indnstrial Commission. It has ahrnys corn. 
plied with all of the rules, regulations and practices of 
the Industrial Commission and it has always filed its 
annual reports and paid its annual self-insurers tax<'~ 
to the State Tax Commission. 
Section 35-1-4G of the V\T orkmen's Compensation 
Act, when taken as a whole, gives the Industrial Com-
mission the discretion to determine who qualifies as a 
self-insurer and the extent of records required to mah· 
that determination. But even if the failure of the Com-
mission to call for annual reports would have the effeet 
of suspending a self-insurer's qualifications under thl' 
Act, Section 35-1-57 of the Act only allows an em1Jloyee 
to bring a civil court action agaim;t his employc>r "<lm-
ing the period of noncompliance" and since Defendant 
was in full compliance "With the act for the year of 19G8 
hy filing an annual report with tlw Commission on S<'P-
tember 12, 19G8, Plaintiff's comt action is barred and 
tlu~ trial court properl>' granted Def Pndant's Motion for 
Smnmar>· .T ndgmen t. 
Plaintiff's action m this casP is simply an attempt 
to circumv<>nt tlw legislative intent inherent in tlw 
Vtah \Yorkmen's Compensation Act li:v taking out of 
context a portion of the statnt<> and arg-ning that tech-
nical noncompJiancE~ with that portion should allmY thl' 
COlllJH n::.:at:on provisions of tlw Act to lw discarded. De-
f Pndant has actf>d in complek good faith in qnnlifying 
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itself as a self-insurer under the Act and it and other 
similar self-insurers should not be denied the benefits 
of the Act. Plaintiff has his remedy for his injury by 
accepting the compensation benefits provided in the 
vVorkmen's Compensation Act. 
This Court should affirm the lower court's Summary 
.Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
\\'ORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
7th Floor, Continental Bank 
Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
